1.
The Social Histories of Madness, Law, and Medicine
Wherever there is law, there is madness. Wherever there are legal relations between people, there is a legal issue as to how those relations are affected by the insanity of one of the parties. Legal treatises contain no shortage of cases regarding capacity to make wills, to marry, to sign contracts, to testify in court, to engage in criminal or civil litigation, or to be convicted of a crime. Similarly, wherever there is madness, law is usually close by. The Crown's jurisdiction over the estates and persons of lunatics and idiots had been codified by the early fourteenth century, 1 and seems to have existed considerably earlier. The differences are not merely a matter of professional emphasis. They extend to the basic understanding of madness.
In law, insanity was not a state of being or subsisting condition, analogous to a disease. English law had nothing which corresponded to `judicial personhood' in continental legal systems. 6 Instead, English law compartmentalized insanity. For English law, insanity was not intrinsic to the individual, but was determined by the abilities of the individual in the context of the specific situation. Thus for admission to an asylum, the statutes required it to be shown that an individual was 'a proper person to be taken charge of and detained under care and treatment '. 7 Compare this to the following test, used in 1870 to determine the validity of a will:
It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties-that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made. 8 Various consequences of interest to historians of madness flow from this approach of compartmentalisation.
First, as a pragmatic matter of understanding the lives of the insane, it is and has always been procedurally very difficult to lose all rights at law. For example, confinement in an institution did not necessarily preclude an individual from making a valid will or an enforceable contract. This is significant not merely for understanding the rights and legal status of the subject; it also places a particular dynamic on the relationship of care. Since law did not deprive insane individuals of all rights, extra-legal control mechanisms such as surveillance or controlling access to the mad person might be particularly important to ensure their safety and appropriate conduct. Second, since insanity in law is bound up with a specific factual situation, legal determinations of insanity and incapacity require narration of those relevant factual contexts. In some cases, such as major competency determinations, these narrations can be quite extensive. The test of testamentary incapacity cited above gives some indication of the scope of evidence to be considered. Clearly, the range of property of the individual was relevant; but equally important would be the relations with the presumed heirs, and whether any animosity was the result of a deluded imagination or instead an appropriate response to the heirs' waywardness or cruelty. The court reports can thus provide considerable information as to the day-to-day situation of the alleged mad person.
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Care is appropriate to the use of the documents in this way, however. The criteria applied by the courts reflected the substantive law in question, and just as the medical history of insanity is bound up with the practical history of doctoring, so the legal history of insanity cannot be divorced from the broader history of law. Cases regarding competency to contract, for example, provide specific insight into the sort of rationality seen to be required for contract law and, by extension, the conceptualization not merely of insanity but also of contract law itself. That provides interesting possibilities for research into the history of contract law, but, for the historian of madness, care is required. The law also had policies of varying formality as to how closely it would scrutinize decisions. In Evans v. Knight and Moore, 11 for example, it was held that the degree of evidence necessary to establish testamentary capacity varied according to whether the will 'gave effect to probable intentions'. In that case, the will was 'precisely such a disposition as natural affection would dictate', 12 and testamentary capacity was found notwithstanding rather weak evidence. It is at least arguable that this sort of result-oriented approach may colour the presentation of the facts in the narrative, and scholars should not approach these texts more naively than they would any other source of the period.
While the history of madness can no longer be reduced to the history of medical practice, medicine is still of course understood as particularly relevant to the history of insanity.
Here, too, legal sources have much to offer. Law has not remained static over the last near-millennium, and it of course has been influenced by medical knowledge, particularly in the last two hundred years. For that same period, the appearance of psychiatrists as expert witnesses was arguably a strategy to enhance professional reputation. This suggests pressure on doctors to re-formulate their ideas in a way which would be comprehensible to the legal system. it is unlikely to be a statistically balanced sample. The economics of litigation mean that reported case law is likely to concern predominantly wealthy parties. The impact of law on other classes is less likely to appear in this source. In addition, the cases reported are those of interest to lawyers of the period, generally because of their relevance in setting new legal precedent. The fact that they are precedent-making may well indicate that they were factually or legally unusual:
it cannot be assumed that they are `typical' of anything. 
Criminal Insanity
The treatment of the insane under criminal law is the one area where the history of law and madness has a large and diverse literature. I will make no attempt here to summarize this literature, which tends to concern the development of the defence of insanity. Existing research does not address the degree to which these changes were a result of pressures from within the legal system, from the broader socio-economic system, or from medical professionalisation. The move towards a functional test of competency could perhaps be portrayed as a response to the needs of the broader economic system, and on its face does not suggest a more medicalized approach. At the same time, medical evidence appears to be increasingly common in these cases, and medical debates and developments are reflected in the case law. In legal practice, and for discussion of the mechanics of research, the determination of civil competence may conveniently be divided into two aspects. First, there was the Royal Prerogative power, a process by which individuals could be declared to be an idiot or lunatic, and their common law rights restricted. Secondly, issues of competency could be raised in specific litigation, most frequently on the question of whether an individual was competent to execute a will or contract. While the same sorts of factual situation fell to be determined under both procedures, they were completely separate processes, governed by separate legal structures. While the issue under the former procedure was expressly the lunacy or idiocy of the individual, the issue under the latter was whether the will was valid or the contract enforceable. The former was heard by specific administrative officials. By the mid-nineteenth century, a considerable statutory basis had developed for its procedures. The forum for the latter was determined by the type of action at issue -almost always a trial -and was governed almost exclusively by precedent rather than statute.
The Royal Prerogative Power
The Royal Prerogative power (also called issuing a Commission in Lunacy or being found lunatic or idiot 'by inquisition') was the closest England came to a general finding of insanity. In its mediaeval origins, it had the effect of making the subject, called the 'lunatic so found', a ward of Before 1833, the proceedings were under the control of three of these officials; after 1833, one official had control of the inquisition. 
Other Issues of Competency
Issues of capacity in the context of a specific will arise in probate courts, and in the context of specific contracts in the courts of common law and equity which had jurisdiction to try contractual matters. In addition, a considerable number of insane persons were kept in union workhouses, largely outside the scope of the lunacy legislation.
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Until 1867, they had an ambiguous status.
While apparently they were often prevented from leaving the workhouse by the union authorities, they were not legally confined under the terms of the lunacy statutes. This situation was changed by an 1867 statute, which allowed the workhouse medical officer to confine persons in workhouses under specified circumstances.
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Sadly, few records appear to remain explaining how this jurisdiction was exercised.
While processes for admission to an asylum or madhouse depended on the legal status of the individual, the applicable administrative framework depended on the type of facility.
County asylums were essentially under the control of the Justices of the Peace in quarter session. Legislation in 1808
had for the first time allowed Justices to order asylum construction, and provided that it be funded by county rates. The Commissioners in Lunacy had a broader role as well.
In 1842, they conducted a national inspection of county asylums, madhouses, and some workhouses. Documentary records continue to exist both for the central authorities, and, often, at the local level as well. The lunacy statutes prescribed a variety of documents that had to be kept, including patient registers, case books, and admission documents. The following discussion will focus on the legal character of these documents. Some were intended to convince that legal standards were being met. Others had their content defined largely according to administrative order by the Lunacy Commissioners. The remarks which follow are to serve the dual purpose of introducing the range of documents available, and convincing medical historians who already work on these documents that legal historical issues are relevant to their work.
Local Documents
The survival of documents of local facilities is, predictably, a hit-and-miss affair. Occasionally, the documents of private facilities are found in private or public archive collections. 93 Documents from county asylums seem more uniformly preserved. Some of these institutions are still functional, and hold their own records; others have donated their records to county record offices.
Throughout the modern period, significant care of the insane has been provided through the poor law. Until 1834, this was the responsibility of local magistrates the quarter sessions records detailing admissions to poor houses, bridewells and outdoor relief contain indications of the care of the insane in this period. 94 Even after 1834, the poor law remained involved. When paupers were admitted to county asylums or, more rarely, private facilities, the bulk of the administration was handled by the poor law relieving officer, and (especially after 1853) the poor law medical officer. 95 Further, as noted above, a considerable number of insane persons were kept in workhouses. Poor law union records, now generally kept in county archives, are thus also a potential source of information.
County asylums were run until 1888 by the local Justices of the Peace. Their minutes, along with those of their asylum sub-committee, will be filed with other quarter sessions documents in county record offices. The content of these minutes is a somewhat hit and miss affair. They may contain helpful information for particularly significant events, such as the construction of a new asylum, and they may well document the rules and schedules of the asylum, and discussion of employment and termination of employment of asylum staff, particularly the medical superintendent, the clerk of the asylum, the bursar and the chaplain. There does not appear to be any consistent policy as to the degree of delegation of management from the asylum sub-committee, however. In some asylums, the committee appears to have been content to leave day-to-day matters and medical treatment to the asylum staff.
In others, the Justices remained influential even in the minutiae of running the asylum, and their records can be extremely informative. Hanwell asylum in London provides a particularly good example of such interventionist magistrates.
Akihito Suzuki uses the quarter sessions papers to show that the Justices, at least as much as medical superintendent John
Conolly were the instigators of non-restraint at that institution from the end of the 1830s. 96 Quarter sessions records do not however tend to include a great deal of information about individual patients, where nineteenth-century admission documents and case books tend to provide more complete information.
The documents required to be kept by county asylums and private madhouses were defined by statute, and the forms can generally be found as schedules to the major acts.
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By midnineteenth century, they included admission documents, medical case books, and various registers of patients. Benthamite streak in nineteenth-century administration, the case books were to keep particulars 'in a manner so clear and distinct, that they may admit of being easily referred to, and extracted, whenever the Commissioners shall so require'.
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Personal details, appearance, symptoms, and history were to be recorded in specified detail. The form does appear to have been influential. My own research does show departures from this standard, but these were largely consistent with the aim of reenforcing the appropriateness of the committal as described above.
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The point here is not that these medical records are irrelevant to understanding the development of psychiatric science. Medical men presumably acted in the utmost good faith in their completion. They did so, however, in a legal context, which must be taken into account in assessing the documents. In the twentieth century, the tendency is to take regulatory structures for granted. It must be emphasized that such a view is entirely inappropriate in considering the nineteenth century. For both central authorities, continued existence was a tenuous matter. Centralized authority was highly controversial at the local level, and the behaviour of both sets of commissioners is to be understood accordingly.
Documents of the Central Authorities
The legal power of the Commissioners to effect change was firmly limited. Exercise of even these limited legal powers in a high-handed way would carry significant political costs, and might be counter-productive in the longer term. There was a pressure on the commissioners to be ingratiating in communications with local authorities. Similarly, their annual and special reports cannot be divorced from this political culture: these reports had to convince the funder that a good job was being done. These pressures permeated the work of the central authorities; it is ill-advised to take their statements as in any way 'objective', or divorced from this political, legal and constitutional context.
Conclusion
Far from being the new kid on the block, law has been concerned with madness for centuries. While the insanity defence and the confinement of the insane are of course important sites of that concern, the legal interest in madness extends throughout the legal realm, both in the court structure and in the plethora of documents defining and articulating legal relations. The documents discussed above provide opportunities to the historian to juxtapose the theoretical conceptions of madness articulated by law and medicine. The conceptions are not (or at least not always) antagonistic.
Often, legal and medical approaches interact in co-operative ways, raising the question of whether they should be considered two histories or one.
This complexity of legal and medical relations exists not merely on a theoretical, but also on a practical level. It is not until 1991 that a jury was required following a finding of unfitness to plead to determine whether the accused even did the act they were accused of: see Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s. 2. Even this amendment does not allow defences to be raised, in the event that the accused is found to have committed the act in question. See, for example, the German Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, paras. 6 and 1910, concerning guardianship and curatorship. This is a descendant of the cura furiosi in the Twelve Tables. See expecially I.1.23.3.4 (Justinian) . I thank Dr. Stephen Girvin for this genealogy. Regarding the development of this approach in post-revolution France, see R. Castel, The Regulation of Madness, (Oxford, 1988) .
Medical History, 42 (1998) Melling and W. Forsythe (eds.), Insanity, Institutions and Society, 1800 -1914 , (London, 1999 Chair: E.S. Campbell, Baron Percy of Newcastle, P.P., 1956 -7, XVI, 1, reprinted (London: 1957 The most recent history of Bethlem, from its mediaeval foundation to the twentieth century, is J. Andrews, A. Briggs, R. Porter, P. Tucker and K. Waddington (eds.), The History of Bethlem, (London, 1997) . 40 Regarding county asylum case books, admission documents, and other records, see below. Bethlem has an active archive, and its current archivist has published a variety of papers about the institution and its inmates: see, for example, P. Allderidge, 'Why was McNaughton sent to Bethlem?', in D. West and A. Walk (eds), Daniel McNaughton,(London, 1977) , 100-12; and P. Allderidge, 'Bedlam: fact or fantasy', in W.F. Bynum, R. Porter and M. Shepherd (eds), The Anatomy of Madness, 3 vols., vol. II, (London: 1985) , 17-33. 41 The reporters do begin self-censoring in the late eighteenth century, regarding trials deemed too scandalous to be reported. Historians of sodomy, for example, will find some of the nineteenth-century records frustrating in this regard. Thus for example Jenkins v. Morris, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 674 was a case in which an individual was subject to a delusion that his land was polluted with sulphur. He leased it at a rate which would have been advantageous to him if the land had been so polluted, but not otherwise. The court held that, notwithstanding his delusion, he had the required mental ability to sign the lease. Thus Jessel M.R. holds expressly that 'although a man may believe a farm to be impregnated with sulphur and not fit for himself to live in, he may still be a shrewd man of business ' [p. 683] Pronounced with accents on first and third syllable; i.e., one to whom management of the estate is committed.
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Some sources actually cite the desirability of potential heirs acting as committees of the estate, since their interest like that of the lunatic would be in its preservation, while dependents other than heirs would be made guardians of the person, since they had a direct interest in the lunatics continued physical well-being.
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(1862), c. 86, s. 20; 45 & 46 Vic. (1882) , c. 82, s. 4. Visits were less frequent if the individual was in a private madhouse, and thus subject to other official visits. Each visit was to have at least one medical and at least one legal Visitor present.
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PRO LCO 1, 2, and 4 is the correspondence between the Masters in Lunacy and the Chancery Visitors, often containing comment about proposed legislation and copies of revisions to rules under the Acts. PRO LCO 9 are the minutes of meetings of the Chancery Visitors. While these minutes give minimal detail regarding individual patients, they do provide an indication of the sorts of decisions the Visitors were involved in, e.g., leaves of absense of patients from asylum, agreements to move individuals between asylums, etc. The probate allegations are contained in PRO PROB 18, at the Public Record Office. There is a card index of this class in the Public Record Office, organised by both name of deceased and name of the case. The documents in PROB 18 can be used to identify those cases where testimentary capacity was challenged. Answers to the allegations are filed in PRO PROB 25. Answers are organized by date. Exhibits are contained in PRO PROB 31. The card index to this class appears to include only inventories of property, and will therefore not be complete for those interested in issues of capacity. A better index to this class is contained in PRO PROB 33. Indices on open shelves in the PRO provide a key between numbering in the original documentation and the bundle and piece numbers in the Public Record Office.
Particularly voluminous cases are not contained in these series, but separately in PRO PROB 26 (depositions) and PROB 37 (cause papers). A number of these cases concern issues of capacity, including Frere v. Peacocke, Evans v. Knight, Prinsep and East India Co. v. Dyce Sombre, Waring v. Waring, and Bannatyne v. Bannatyne. These matters are not contained in the indices to PROB 18, noted above, but are contained in the index volumes on open shelves in the PRO.
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Particularly common were cases involving disputes as to which poor law union was liable for the maintenance of a pauper lunatic. Such of these as were reported are usually contained in Law Reports (New Series) Magistrates' Cases, which is indexed by volume. Less frequent were wrongful confinement cases involving private madhouses. The precedent-making cases are referred to in the legal treatises cited in appendix I.
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For general discussion, see H. Arthurs, Without the Law, (Toronto, 1985 
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The poor law officials did not have the legal power to discharge patients in county asylums; but as the persons controlling payment for the detention of paupers, they had considerable influence regarding continued detention.
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The Commissioners did publish a summary of asylum treatment techniques and efficacy as an appendix to their 1847 Supplementary Report, P.P., 1847, in octavo 1847-8, XXXII, 371. 103 See P. Bartlett, Poor Law of Lunacy, chapter 5. 104 A biography of Gaskell is contained in A. Scull, C. MacKenzie and N. Hervey, Masters of Bedlam, (Princeton, 1996) , chapter 6.
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For a particularly scathing reaction to this appointment, see Journal of Mental Science, 4 (1858), 127. 106 Researchers interested in the Commissioners in Lunacy should consult the work of Nicholas Hervey, and particularly his doctoral dissertation, 'The Lunacy Commission 1845-60'
